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Policies for international reserve accumulation 
under a floating exchange rate regime: 




During the past eight years the Bank of Mexico, has implemented monetary policy under a floating 
exchange rate regime. The central bank has refrained from discrete interventions in the foreign 
exchange market and avoided signalling any desired exchange rate level. Nevertheless, an impressive 
stock of net international reserves has been accumulated throughout this period. This paper deals with 
the policies of international reserve accumulation adopted by the Mexican financial authorities from 
1995 to 2003. In particular, it shows that authorities have taken decisions by assessing the benefits 
and costs of marginally increasing international reserves, taking into account the restrictions imposed 
by the prevailing economic conditions and institutional arrangements. They have ensured that central 
bank participation in the foreign exchange market follows previously announced rules so as not to 
disturb the normal operation of the floating exchange rate regime. 
The paper is organised in five sections. The first discusses the reasons behind the decision to adopt a 
floating exchange rate regime and deregulate the foreign exchange market; the second describes the 
mechanisms used to accumulate international reserves during the period 1996-2001; the third deals 
with the consequences of international reserve accumulation, both for the formulation of monetary 
policy and for the financial situation of the central bank; the fourth focuses on the policies of 
international reserve accumulation put in place during the period 2001-03, after the Bank of Mexico 
had acquired a large stock of foreign assets; and the fifth offers some conclusions. 
2.  Floating as a long-term policy decision 
For a number of years before the onset of the 1994-95 financial crisis, Mexico’s exchange rate regime 
had been gradually becoming more flexible. To begin with, the rate had been allowed to fluctuate 
within an ever widening band, with a fixed floor and an upward crawling ceiling. Furthermore, some 
initial steps had been taken to foster the development of an institutional framework that would support 
more exchange rate flexibility. 
Aiming for more flexibility was consistent with a series of liberalisation measures introduced in Mexico 
at the beginning of the 1990s. These policies deregulated the financial sector and reduced the 
participation of the public sector in the economy. As an important aspect of the latter, a large number 
of public sector enterprises were sold to the private sector. Deposit and lending rates were freed, 
commercial banks’ liquidity requirements were eliminated and credit allocation directives were 
abolished. Last but not least, a free trade agreement was signed with Canada and the United States 
and restrictions on foreign ownership of financial and non-financial companies were largely phased 
out. 
After pegging the exchange rate for close to seven years, the Bank of Mexico was forced to let the 
peso float in December 1994. This was the only viable alternative at the time considering that the 
stock of international reserves had been almost completely depleted fending off several speculative 
attacks during 1994. Thus, the central bank was unable to influence exchange rate levels through 
foreign exchange market intervention. Furthermore, available international reserves barely covered a 
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minimal part of the debt amortisation payments in foreign currency due at that time, which were 
concentrated in tesobonos (dollar-indexed government securities) and in short-term liabilities of 
Mexican commercial banks (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Net international assets and 
short-term amortisation payments 
In billions of US dollars 
 1994  1995 
Net international assets  2.3  –1.5 
International reserves  6.1  15.7 
Less liabilities with:     
IMF 3.9  15.8 
Other central banks  0.0  1.5 
Short-term amortisation payments  57.9  26.3 
Tesobonos 29.2  0.2 
Public sector  6.4  7.2 
Commercial banks  15.5  11.9 
Private sector  6.8  6.9 
Sources: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1994 and 1995; Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Data Book, 1994 and 1995. 
 
Tesobonos were zero coupon bills which paid, at face value, the amount of Mexican pesos required to 
buy a fixed quantity of US dollars. The pesos that the government had to disburse to the holder were 
computed by applying the spot exchange rate prevailing in the market two days in advance of maturity. 
This procedure implied that, to hedge their risk exposure, holders had to buy US dollars precisely at 
the time when the settlement exchange rate was determined. Therefore an important source of 
instability was introduced into the foreign exchange market, since bondholders became indifferent to 
any peso depreciation induced by their demand for US dollars. Moreover, during the first quarter of 
1995 depreciation pressures on the peso arose after foreign financial institutions decided to close 
short-term credit lines to Mexican commercial banks. 
The immediate goal of economic policy in early 1995 was to stabilise the exchange rate and ensure 
the solvency of the government. The first required securing an international financial assistance 
package, very aggressive hikes in domestic interest rates and the removal of dollar-indexed 
government securities holders from the foreign exchange market. The second involved a refinancing 
of liabilities, expenditure control and more revenues. 
A priority during 1995 was to honour all short-term amortisation payments by refinancing them with 
credits obtained from alternative sources (multilateral financial organisations, central banks and the 
US government). In addition, a macroeconomic adjustment programme ensured an orderly contraction 
of domestic demand consistent with significantly narrowing the current account deficit and reducing 
the public sector borrowing requirements. In order to ease pressures on the foreign exchange market, 
the Bank of Mexico opened a facility to settle the amortisation of tesobonos directly in US dollars. The 
central bank also provided a credit line in US dollars to the deposit insurance trust fund (FOBAPROA), 
which in turn offered foreign currency liquidity to Mexican commercial banks facing the closure of 
interbank credit lines with foreign counterparts. 
By the end of 1995 it was evident that the strategy had been successful. Payment obligations were 
honoured and the economy embarked on a process of rapid recovery. The financial situation was not 
as critical as it had been before. Short-term capital payments for 1996 were less than half the amount 
previously estimated for that year (Table 1). Mexican commercial banks regained access to foreign 
credit, so that during the second quarter of 1995 the central bank’s emergency credit line to 218  BIS Papers No 23
 
 
FOBAPROA was fully paid back. In addition, by the end of the year the federal government was able 
to place debt instruments in international financial markets. 
The improving macroeconomic environment and the stabilisation of the exchange rate opened the 
opportunity to reconsider the prevailing exchange rate arrangement. Mexico had a long history with 
fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes. However, at that point it had only very limited experience 
with a free float. Policymakers pondered the merits of keeping the float as an important element of 
long-term economic policy. In fact, the suggestion to adopt a currency board - which had been rejected 
in the past - gained renewed strength. 
Many raised their voices in opposition to maintaining the float. The fragility of the banking system and 
the high levels of uncertainty prevailing in the domestic financial markets were often mentioned as 
factors to justify a framework for pegging the exchange rate. There were also some prestigious 
academics who vehemently argued in favour of reintroducing a currency band, pointing to the then 
successful Chilean experience. 
The “fear of floating” literature and the lack of instances of other emerging market countries with a float 
continued to fuel doubts about the regime. In this regard some argued that implementing monetary 
policy in small open economies was not feasible without a nominal anchor. They warned that “fear of 
floating” would prevail over any other objective variable. Even though all kinds of different concerns 
were covered in the analysis, the financial authorities decided that a floating exchange rate regime 
was the best policy option for Mexico. 
The decision to continue floating was based on the conviction that it was the best arrangement to 
prevent the exchange rate from drifting away from its equilibrium value for long periods, discourage 
short-term capital inflows, inhibit speculative attacks and extract information on market expectations. 
The authorities were convinced of the difficulties of targeting the exchange rate in a small open 
economy with unrestricted capital movement. The intensity of the 1994 speculative attacks on the 
peso, as well as the 1992 European experience with fixed exchange rates, also played an important 
role in convincing the authorities of their inability to counter the effects of today’s huge international 
capital flows. 
The authorities were aware that, for the floating exchange rate regime to function properly, it was 
essential to have liquid markets. Otherwise, the exchange rate could become highly volatile. To 
increase liquidity in the peso foreign market, the Bank of Mexico removed all the restrictions imposed 
in preceding years and encouraged the development of derivatives markets. Hence, during 1995 the 
central bank allowed participants to operate forwards and authorised foreign banks to settle their 
foreign exchange transactions in pesos. As a result, the daily volume traded in the foreign exchange 
market increased tenfold (Graph 1). 
Graph 1 
Daily volume traded in the foreign exchange market 
In billions of US dollars 
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3.  The policy of international reserve accumulation during 1996-2001: 
a float with accumulation 
Although the exchange rate was to be determined by market forces, Mexican financial authorities 
decided to include the build-up of international reserves as an objective in the 1996 economic 
programme. There was at the time, in some influential circles, scepticism about Mexico’s ability to put 
its house in order. If this view became widely shared it was feared that the liquidity crisis could take a 
turn for the worse, becoming a fully fledged solvency crisis. Therefore, the rationale behind reserve 
accumulation went beyond its importance in ensuring compliance with Mexico’s foreign debt 
payments. It was also a signal to foreign investors and international rating agencies, which tend to 
associate a higher level of international reserves with lower country risk. Consequently, a large stock 
of international reserves also meant that Mexican borrowers could have access to more external 
financing on better terms. 
Other catalysts for holding a larger amount of international reserves came to the surface during 1995. 
The first emerged at the beginning of that year, when the Bank of Mexico acted as lender of last resort 
in foreign currency to support some Mexican banks through FOBAPROA. The second arose at the 
end of the year, when the central bank was compelled to intervene in the market to put an end to 
speculative pressures on the peso, fed by perceptions of its unwillingness to intervene given the low 
level of international reserves at hand. 
With the decision to adopt a floating exchange regime for the long term, the policy of international 
reserve accumulation was then designed to avoid, as much as possible, any interference with the 
normal functioning of the foreign exchange market. In this regard, with a view to regaining market 
credibility, the authorities’ commitment to the floating regime was frequently emphasised along with 
their decision to conduct monetary and exchange rate policies transparently. 
The policy of international reserve accumulation took into account the restrictions imposed by the 
institutional framework affecting foreign exchange operations undertaken by the Bank of Mexico with 
public sector entities. 
3.1  Foreign exchange operations with public sector entities 
For several years the Bank of Mexico has conducted, almost on a daily basis, foreign exchange 
transactions with the federal government and with Pemex,
2 the public enterprise that deals with all 
aspects of the oil industry. Given the large size and unpredictable timing of these foreign currency 
operations, the Foreign Exchange Commission
3 deemed it convenient to prevent them from taking 
place directly in the foreign exchange market and causing unwarranted volatility. The specific strategy 
that the Bank of Mexico applies to operate with public sector entities relies on the use of international 
reserves as a buffer stock. Thus, Pemex’s net foreign exchange receipts (from oil exports and external 
financing) have been partially used to finance the federal government’s foreign exchange 
requirements to service its external debt. Since Pemex’s receipts have usually exceeded the federal 
government’s external debt servicing needs, the central bank has ended up increasing its international 
reserve stock. 
The regulation imposed on Pemex does not coerce the firm to sell to the Bank of Mexico any specific 
fraction of its foreign currency receipts at a particular date. In fact, it has total discretion on the amount 
                                                       
2  The legal basis for these transactions is found in the Law of the Bank of Mexico. Article 3 enables the central bank to 
provide treasury services to the federal government. Article 34 entitles the central bank to impose restrictions on foreign 
currency operations conducted by entities of the Federal Public Administration. The only entity that is currently subject to 
this restriction is Pemex, which has to carry out with the central bank any buy/sell operation of foreign currency against 
Mexican pesos. 
3  According to Article 21 of the Law of the Bank of Mexico, in foreign exchange matters the central bank shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines established by the Foreign Exchange Commission. This Commission is formed by the 
Secretary and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, another undersecretary of said Ministry 
appointed by the Secretary, the central bank Governor and two more members of the Board of Governors selected by the 
Governor. The Commission is presided over by the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, who has the decisive vote in the 
event of a tie. Resolutions of the Commission are reached by majority vote, if and only if such majority includes at least one 
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and timing of any foreign currency sales to the central bank, subject only to some contractual 
conditions of an operational nature. The main reason for Pemex’s selling most of its foreign currency 
receipts to the central bank follows from its legal obligation to discharge its tax liabilities with Mexican 
pesos. 
In terms of their contribution to international reserve accumulation, Table 2 shows that foreign 
exchange operations conducted by Bank of Mexico with public sector entities have been the most 
significant source of reserves. 
 
Table 2 
Decomposition by source of annual flows of international assets 
In billions of US dollars 





1996  6.3 9.0  –3.6  0.9 0.0 
1997  13.5 8.5 0.9  3.8 0.4 
1998  3.7 5.4  –3.3  0.3 1.2 
1999  3.9 7.4  –6.5  1.8 1.2 
2000 8.2  11.2  –6.8 1.8  2.1 
2001  9.2 8.9  –2.4  1.4 1.4 
1  Includes net income generated by investment of the Bank of Mexico’s international assets. 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
International reserve accumulation was particularly intense during 1996 and 1997, reflecting: 
(1)  Relatively high oil prices (the average WTI price then was 20% above the level seen in 
previous years); and 
(2)  The federal government’s successful efforts to secure foreign financing in excess of its 
external debt service needs. 
This favourable situation was reversed during 1998, when oil prices declined by almost 30% and the 
availability of foreign financing was substantially curtailed due to the East Asian and Russian crises. 
3.2 Automatic  mechanisms 
In August 1996 the Foreign Exchange Commission announced the implementation of a scheme to buy 
US dollars through put options, which gave commercial banks the right to sell them to the central bank 
provided certain conditions in terms of the foreign exchange rate were satisfied. The objective was to 
accumulate international reserves beyond those flows obtained through foreign exchange operations 
conducted with public sector entities. 
The options strategy enabled the central bank to increase international reserves without exerting 
undue pressure on the foreign exchange market or sending signals that could interfere with the proper 
functioning of the floating exchange rate regime. The aim was to purchase US dollars when the market 
offered them and to refrain from doing so when the exchange rate was under depreciation pressure. 
These objectives were incorporated into the mechanism’s design, which included special features 
such as: BIS Papers No 23  221
 
 
(1)  Exercise price. “Fix” exchange rate (MXN/USD) computed for the preceding day.
4 
Consequently, this price was not set at a level previously determined by the financial 
authorities, but endogenously adjusted to market conditions. 
(2)  Knock-in restriction. Financial intermediaries could sell US dollars to the central bank if 
and only if the exercise price was below the moving average of the “fix” exchange rate 
computed for the previous 20 working days. Because of this the central bank was able to 
avoid purchasing dollars when the exchange rate appreciated from one day to the next 
(perhaps due to a possible correction in response to a previous overshooting). Otherwise it 
would have been favourable for option holders to exercise them and immediately repurchase 
the dollars on the exchange market. 
(3)  Option type and placement. Put options were of the American type, so that in any day of 
the month commercial banks could exercise them as long as the knock-in restriction was 
satisfied. Regarding the procedure to place these options among banks, this was carried out 
through a multiple price auction conducted on the last working day of the previous month. 
The put options programme successfully attained its objectives. From August 1996 to June 2001 the 
Bank of Mexico accumulated USD 12.2 billion of international reserves through this mechanism, an 
amount equivalent to 75% of the total auctioned (Table 3). Put options contributed almost one third of 
the increase in international reserves during the aforementioned period. Moreover, this accumulation 
was achieved without causing severe distortions to the foreign exchange market or altering the nature 
of the flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
Table 3 
Put options mechanism 





1 0.9  0.9 
1997 5.2  4.4 
1998 2.8  1.5 
1999 3.0  2.2 
2000 3.0  1.8 
2001
2 1.5  1.4 
Memo: 1996-2001  16.3  12.2 
1  Starting in August.   
2  Up to June. 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
To complement the options scheme for accumulating reserves, on 19 February 1997 the Foreign 
Exchange Commission authorised the Bank of Mexico to undertake daily sales of up to 
USD 200 million to market participants through auctions. This mechanism was geared to mitigate the 
volatility in the foreign exchange market by providing liquidity during days when uncertainty prevailed, 
thus discouraging some participants from engaging in speculative strategies. The selling process was 
implemented through auctions conducted each day and by imposing on banks the requirement that 
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valid bids had to be at least equal to a minimum price, determined by the “fix” exchange rate of the 
previous day multiplied by a depreciation factor of 1.02. 
Recourse to the auction facility to sell dollars to participants in the foreign exchange market was 
infrequent. This was so because only under fairly atypical conditions did the exchange rate depreciate 
at least 2% in a single day. In fact, the sales facility was activated on only 14 days between February 
1997 and June 2001. Furthermore, almost 60% of total sales occurred during the period from August 
1998 to January 1999, which was characterised by very high volatility in international financial 
markets. Because liquidity was smoothly provided to the foreign exchange market during episodes of 
turbulence, it can be said that this strategy was also successful. Yet, it did not prevent the Bank of 
Mexico from implementing its only discrete intervention after 1995, which took place on 10 September 
1998, involving a sale of USD 278 million. The net accumulation of international reserves obtained 
through the use of automatic mechanisms is presented in Table 4. In particular, it is important to 
underline that close to 16% of the dollars acquired by the central bank through the exercise of put 
options were recycled to the foreign exchange market via auctioned sales. 
 
Table 4 
International reserve accumulation 
through automatic mechanisms 
In billions of US dollars 
Options exercised  Sales auctioned  Net accumulation 
 
(A) (B)  (A–B)
1 
1996
2  0.9 0.0 0.9 
1997  4.4 0.6 3.8 
1998  1.5 0.9 0.6 
1999  2.2 0.4 1.8 
2000  1.8 0.1 1.8 
2001
3  1.4 0.0 1.4 
Memo:  1996-2001  1.4 0.0 1.4 
1  Some entries are subject to rounding error.   
2  Starting in August.   
3  Up to June. 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
4.  Consequences of the build-up of international reserves: the sterilisation 
policy and its costs 
The accumulation of international reserves had implications for the implementation of open market 
operations aimed at regulating money market liquidity. As the central bank’s international reserves 
grew, so did the amount of liquidity that had to be sterilised. By April 1997, international reserves 
measured in pesos were larger than the stock of base money (Graph 2). As the accumulation 
continued, the central bank had to devise more effective means to nullify the monetary impact of its 
acquisition of foreign currencies, since the sterilisation policies being followed were having undesirable 
effects on the conduct of monetary policy. 
4.1 Monetary  policy  implications 
Sterilisation policies implemented as from 1997 were designed to avoid signalling desired interest rate 
levels to the market. This was considered of crucial importance given that the operational procedures BIS Papers No 23  223
 
 
to implement monetary policy have as their target commercial banks’ end-of-day settlement balances 
at the central bank. It is important to stress that the central bank does not remunerate settlement 
balances. Therefore, for reasons of symmetry, it charges a penalty rate on overdrafts equivalent to 
twice the overnight interbank interest rate. Restrictive monetary policies are signalled by announcing 
the intention of the central bank not to fully satisfy the demand for funds, thus forcing some 
commercial banks to incur overdrafts on their accounts at the central bank. In other words, the central 
bank leaves the market short of funds. This is the mechanism known as “corto” in Spanish. Such 
monetary policy signalling, transmitted through changes in the settlement balances objective, is 
designed to indicate desired upward or downward changes in interest rates without specifying 
particular levels. 
Graph 2 
























































































































































































Source: Bank of Mexico. 
The speed and scale of international reserve accumulation in 1997 led the Bank of Mexico to reduce 
its primary credit. Otherwise, the excess money supply that would have been created could have 
resulted in higher inflation and rising nominal and real interest rates. Thus, from the beginning of 1997 
the stock of net domestic credit moved to negative territory. In order to drain the liquidity resulting from 
international reserve accumulation, commercial banks were induced to make deposits at the central 
bank. In addition, at a later date, the Bank of Mexico sold government paper in the open market. 
Consequently, the financial position of the central bank went from net creditor to net debtor. 
Meanwhile, vis-à-vis the rest of the world, its net creditor position strengthened. 
From the early months of 1997 on, the policy of absorbing liquidity relied mainly on auction-determined 
commercial bank deposits at the central bank. During March and early April, interbank rates started to 
climb, notwithstanding the fact that the exchange rate was appreciating and rates on government 
paper remained relatively stable. This odd behaviour of short-term interest rates and the exchange 
rate was the outcome of a temporary erosion of competition in the money market, due to the following 
factors: 
(1)  Commercial bank deposits at the central bank had no secondary market. Consequently, 
banks attempted to obtain a risk premium to compensate for their lack of liquidity and 
demanded a much higher return in order to make additional deposits. 224  BIS Papers No 23
 
 
(2)  Occasionally, liquidity was concentrated in a small number of banks and it was relatively 
easy for them to apply money market strategies aimed at securing higher returns on their 
deposits at the central bank. 
To deal with this situation, and restore orderly conditions in the money market, the Bank of Mexico 
increasingly turned to sales of long-term government paper (BONDES), both through direct sales and 
repos. Commercial banks were then willing to forgo their liquidity since in return they received 
government paper which had a secondary market. 
Upward pressure on interest rates eased and the premium demanded on deposits at the central bank 
virtually disappeared as more players participated in the market. The latter were banks which did not 
have excess liquidity at the time of the auctions held to entice deposits. In the new setup, those banks 
could incur overdrafts on their current accounts at the central bank to acquire government paper. 
Should the need arise, banks could resell the paper immediately and thus cover the overdraft. 
Maintaining a net creditor position vis-à-vis the financial system in order to preserve the effectiveness 
of monetary policy became an explicit objective of the Bank of Mexico. In addition to recurrent sales of 
long-term government paper, it relied on compulsory deposits wherever the expansion of liquidity 
outran the sterilisation process. These deposits were implemented as a once-and-for-all given amount 
of liquidity drawn from the money market sporadically.
5 
By the middle of 2000 it became obvious that commercial banks were holding too much long-term 
government paper as a result of the sterilisation process. Moreover, the banks were funding their 
holdings of long-term government paper on a daily basis. Thus, banks were unduly exposed to upward 
movements in interest rates, at a time when the central bank was implementing a restrictive monetary 
policy to counter aggregate demand pressures. 
In response, beginning in August 2000 the Bank of Mexico started to issue its own securities, called 
BREMs (Monetary Regulation Bonds).
6 BREMs are marketable floating coupon bonds (the coupon is 
determined every 28 days and is equal to the average of the daily overnight interbank interest rate 
observed during that 28-day period) which have a relatively long term to maturity (one and three 
years). These securities are placed weekly through primary auctions that are open to commercial 
banks, brokerage houses and investment funds. 
The stock of sterilisation instruments (BREMs) placed by the Bank of Mexico has followed an upward 
trend (Graph 3) in tandem with the path of international reserves. On average, close to 76% of the 
stock of international reserves valued in Mexican pesos has been financed through such instruments. 
The remaining portion has been financed mainly with base money. To the extent that domestic interest 
rates have remained significantly above the level of international rates, the Bank of Mexico has faced 
the non-trivial costs of accumulating international reserves. 
Regarding the choice of sterilisation instrument, it is important to stress that this decision does not 
depend on the type of factor inducing the excess of liquidity, but rather on the actual and projected 
path of liquidity. 
4.2  Implications for the financial situation of the central bank 
Even though sterilisation policy helped preserve the effectiveness of monetary policy procedures, 
success came at a cost. First of all, given that domestic interest rates have been higher than 
international rates, the liabilities in pesos incurred by the central bank have an impact on interest costs 
in excess of the returns obtained from investing the stock of international reserves. Furthermore, as 
the exchange rate has fluctuated, the value in pesos of a given stock of international reserves has 
                                                       
5  Compulsory deposits have been required on several occasions (September 1998; February 1999; July 2001; and April 
2003). There was also an instance of voluntary deposits in September 2002 which were converted to mandatory deposits in 
April 2003. 
6  Before August 2000, the Bank of Mexico used government securities in the sterilizsation process. However, in order to have 
total independence from the federal government regarding sterilisation policy, and to take advantage of the intense activity 
in the overnight market, the Bank took the decision to issue BREMs. BIS Papers No 23  225
 
 
gone up or down. Since the appreciation trend of the exchange rate lasted until April 2000, its 















































































































































































Source: Bank of Mexico. 
Graph 4 





















































































Source: Bank of Mexico. 226  BIS Papers No 23
 
 
5.  The policy of international reserve accumulation during 2001-03: 
slowing the pace 
Through its policy of international reserve accumulation, the Bank of Mexico purchased more than 
USD  38  billion up to March 2001. However, the trend of such purchases and the implications of 
funding the corresponding peso stock motivated an analysis of the benefits and costs of continuing 
with the strategy. The results of this appraisal indicated that the benefits of holding a continuously 
increasing amount of international reserves were not as compelling as before, mainly because Mexico 
had just been granted an investment grade status by all major credit rating agencies and the external 
debt profile of both the public and private sectors had continuously improved during the previous 
years. Cost considerations became more relevant, not just those stemming from the sterilisation 
policy, but also the opportunity costs regarding alternative productive uses of the foreign financing 
accumulated as international reserves. 
The process of assessing the relative advantages of further accumulating international reserves 
benefited from some technical papers produced by Bank of Mexico staff in order to estimate the 
“adequate” level of international reserves. Some of those papers even questioned the wisdom of 
maintaining international reserves under a floating exchange rate regime. The answer to this was that 
international reserves were required by central banks, among other reasons, because they are 
deemed by credit agencies and some financial institutions to be an important factor influencing the 
availability and cost of foreign financing. Accordingly, the “adequate” level of international reserves 
was estimated as a function of the present value of Mexico’s external debt amortisation flows. This 
implied that as the payment profile of the country’s foreign debt improved, the need for international 
reserves should be reduced. The papers provided estimates derived from ad hoc rules and also from 
theoretical models aimed at minimising both the carry-on costs of international reserves and the 
interest rate spread on the external debt. All of them suggested that the level of reserves then at hand 
was more than “adequate”. The case for not pursuing a much higher level of international reserves 
was further strengthened by the possibility that Mexico could become the first country to have access 
to the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility that the IMF was planning to unveil. The CCL offered 
emergency resources to countries with good fundamentals that suffered contagion from events 
unfurling elsewhere. Alternatively, contingent lines could be arranged with foreign commercial banks at 
a lower cost than that associated with additional international reserve accumulation. 
Nonetheless, international reserves continued rising and the stock reached USD  48  billion by 
December 2002, clearly indicating that the termination of the put option mechanism - in June 2001 - in 
order to slow the pace of accumulation had turned out to be insufficient.
7 This result was mainly 
associated with the restrictions imposed by the institutional arrangement regarding the foreign 
exchange operations of the Bank of Mexico with Pemex. In particular, since 1999, Pemex has 
obtained foreign financing for investment projects (PIDIREGAS) that have a special off-budget 
treatment because of their long-term horizon and high rate of return. As shown in Graph 5, foreign 
exchange operations conducted by the Bank of Mexico with Pemex related to PIDIREGAS projects 
have increased both in absolute and in relative terms. 
Taking into account the projected international reserve flows to be derived mainly from foreign 
exchange operations conducted with Pemex, the arguments stressing that the costs of additional 
accumulation were now larger than the benefits acquired added relevance. Consequently, the Foreign 
Exchange Commission decided to implement, starting in May 2003, an automatic mechanism in the 
foreign exchange market with the aim of further easing the pace of international reserve accumulation. 
It is important to underline that by introducing this mechanism the Mexican financial authorities neither 
adopted a target nor defined an optimal level for international reserves. Instead, the objective is to 
supply a fraction of the marginal accumulation of reserves to the market in order to contain the 
financial and opportunity costs of holding additional foreign currency. 
                                                       




Decomposition of foreign currency sales 
by Pemex to the Bank of Mexico 








1999 2000 2001 2002
PIDIREGAS Other operations
 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
The objective of slowing the pace of accumulation has been pursued by the Bank of Mexico by selling, 
through daily auctions, a fixed amount of dollars in the foreign exchange market. The selling 
mechanism is based on a transparent procedure designed to prevent additional uncertainty in the 
financial markets and to minimise discretionary actions by the financial authorities. The main features 
of the mechanism are: 
(1)  Amount. The Bank of Mexico sells US dollars in the foreign exchange market in an amount 
based on the international reserves accumulated during a 13-week measurement period. 
Given the objective of slowing the pace of accumulation, the central bank sells half of the 
international reserves flow registered during the measurement period, whenever the flow has 
a positive sign. The fixed amount of dollars to be sold daily is obtained by dividing the total 
amount allowed under this rule by the number of working days in a three-month period. 
(2)  Transitory suspension. The selling mechanism is temporarily suspended if the amount of 
international reserves to market, obtained in any measurement period of 13 weeks, falls 
below USD 125 million. The mechanism is reactivated once the total accumulation of 
international reserves exceeds USD 250 million for the measuring period. 
(3)  Operational features. Auctions are conducted through an electronic interactive framework 
with Mexican resident banks, at the same time (9.30 am) each working day. The results are 
publicised 10 minutes after the auction is closed at the latest. 
Up to the time of writing (November 2003) there have been three measurement and sales periods 
using the automatic mechanism of daily sales of US dollars through auctions (Table 5). In each of 
them the application of the rules has resulted in a net measured accumulation of international 
reserves, above USD 250 million, and the mechanism has been activated. However, the amount of 228  BIS Papers No 23
 
 
daily sales has decreased from USD  32  million initially to USD  6  million at the time of writing, an 
outcome of the relatively high demand for foreign currency by the federal government to service its 
foreign debt, specifically for the prepayment of Brady bonds in August 2003. 
 
Table 5 
Automatic mechanism for daily sales 
of US dollars through auctions 
In billions of US dollars 
Measurement periods 
1st 2nd 3rd   
17 Jan-16 Apr 2003  16 Apr-18 Jul 2003  18 Jul-17 Oct 2003 
International reserves       
I. Cumulated  flow  4.2  0.0  –0.3 
Explained by:       
a. Pemex  3.7  3.0  3.1 
b. Federal government 0.1  –1.8  –2.7 
c. Market  operations 0.0  –1.8  –1.1 
d. Other  0.4  0.5  0.4 
Sales periods 
1st 2nd 3rd   
1 May-31 Jul 2003  1 Aug-31 Oct 2003  1 Nov 2003- 
31 Jan 2004 
A. Net accumulation (I–a)  4.2  1.8  0.8 
B. Number of working 
days  65 65 61 
Memo: Daily amount of 
sales (A*.5/B)  0.032 0.014 0.006 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of the sales mechanism, a significant easing of the pace of international 
reserve accumulation has been observed and there is no evident impact of the daily auctions on the 
functioning of the foreign exchange market. Nevertheless, the mechanism has caused uncertainty 
among market participants because of the difficulties involved in estimating precisely the amount of 
US dollars that the central bank could sell in the near future. 
6. Concluding  remarks 
The experience of Mexico in implementing a floating exchange rate regime has been successful, as 
evidenced by the relatively low level of volatility of the Mexican peso implicit in option prices, the wide 
choice of hedging instruments and the high volume traded daily in the foreign exchange market. This 
regime is a key element of a strategy that pursues a strictly market-oriented financial system. In this 
regard monetary policy relies on the market to determine the proper level of interest rates while the 
role of central bank actions is limited to signalling the desirable direction of interest rate movements. 
Under this framework market participants decide on the combination of interest and exchange rates 
that is adequate to respond to disturbances affecting the economy. BIS Papers No 23  229
 
 
This paper has discussed the policy of international reserve accumulation implemented by the Bank of 
Mexico during the period in which the Mexican peso has been floating. It has been stressed in the 
discussion that this policy has been designed with the objective of not interfering with the nature of the 
floating exchange rate regime. This is achieved by relying on automatic mechanisms based on 
previously announced rules that do not predetermine any level of the exchange rate. Furthermore, the 
policy of accumulation has been implemented as an element supporting the workings of the floating 
regime, by providing the central bank with degrees of freedom to face unexpected shocks. This policy 
has also taken into account the restrictions imposed by the prevailing environment and the institutional 
arrangements under which the central bank undertakes transactions with public sector entities. 
Mexican financial authorities have made decisions regarding the accumulation of international 
reserves after careful analysis of the benefits and costs of additional flows, rather than by selecting an 
optimal or desired stock. In this regard, international reserve accumulation was chosen as a specific 
economic policy objective. It should be recalled that at the end of 1995 net international assets were 
negative, so that the benefits of accumulating international reserves were clearly higher than the 
foreseeable costs. To attain this objective, due advantage was taken not only of routine foreign 
exchange transactions with public sector entities but also of automatic mechanisms specially designed 
to minimise interference with the operation of the foreign exchange market. As international reserves 
began mounting, the Bank of Mexico had to face the consequence, and did so by sterilising the 
expansion of liquidity in the domestic money market. This policy brought about carry-on costs that 
adversely affected the financial situation of the central bank. The financial authorities recently 
implemented a new automatic mechanism to slow the speed of international reserve accumulation, 
because it was deemed that the financial and opportunity costs induced by the rapid inflow of reserves 
had exceeded the benefits. 